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Abstract
Much of  the  debate  about  the  nature  of  harm regard  the  standard  comparative  views  and  the
alternative non-comparative views. The former claim that harm always involves  a subject that is
made worse off. The latter acknowledges a more absolute understanding of harm, as a subject that
is caused to be in a bad state. The virtues and vices of these views have been wildly debated. Even
thought both notions have intuitive support, they also have serious problems. It has been suggested
quite recently that the nature of harm is best understood as a combination of a comparative and a
non-comparative condition - a disjunctive view. The thought is that the disjunctivist can account for
many of the cases that strict  views struggle with,  since the two senses complement each other.
However,  there are some new potential  problems with combining the two senses of harm. The
disjunctive view has been questioned on the grounds of being ad hoc, incapable of fully solving the
Non-Identity  problem  and  contradicting  Parfit's  No-Difference  View.  This  essay  addresses  the
mentioned worries and explores possible defence strategies.
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1. Introduction
1 Introduction
The standard understanding of the nature of harm is comparative, which means that someone is
harmed if she is made worse off. Hence, a person is harmed if her state is worse compared to her
previous state or the state she would have been in if  a certain event  never took place.  This
standard and intuitive conception of harm works well in most ordinary cases of harm. Examples
of comparative harms are someone getting fired from her job (unjustifiably) and therefore being
unable to pay her expenses or someone getting sad after being yelled at for no good reason. They
are in a worse state due to these events. Moreover, the harm involved is what explains why acts
of this sort are wrongful. However, there is reason to think the standard comparative sense of
harm is insufficient for moral analysis. Consider the following case:
Pollution –  The people  inhabiting  the  earth  at  t1 pollute  the  earth  in  such a  way that
resources will be scarce for people living 400 years later, at t2. Since the water and air lack
sufficient quality at t2, the future people suffer from serious health problems.
Many would say that pollution is wrong because it harms future people by bringing them great
suffering, but the comparative understanding of harm cannot account for that.  Pollution is not
comparatively harmful since no one is made worse off.  If the pollution does not take place the
causal history is altered which results in a different procreational story that alters the identity of
future people. If there is no pollution at t1, then, the people living at t2 will in fact be other people.
Assuming that their lives are worth living, there is no comparison analysis according to which
the people at t2 are worse off.
Since  the  comparative  sense  of  harm cannot  account  for  our  intuitions  about  cases  like
Pollution  it  has  been  argued  that  another,  absolute,  sense  of  harm  is  morally  significant.
According to the non-comparative understanding, a person is harmed if she is caused to be in a
bad state.  Introducing this  into the moral  analysis  enables  us  to  say that  pollution  is  wrong
because the future people at t2  are non-comparatively harmed. They are caused serious health
problems which reasonably are considered as bad. However,  strict  non-comparative views of
harm seem to have counter-intuitive implications as well. Consider the following scenario:
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Stealing from a Billionaire – A jealous neighbor lives next door to a billionaire's villa. The
neighbor feels as though the billionaire drives off in a brand new sports car every single
morning and one day the neighbor has had enough. When the billionaire leaves in the
morning the neighbor breaks in to the garage and steals one of the billionaire's fancy sports
cars. The neighbor likes the car very much and decides to keep it. 
Many of us would want to say that the billionaire is wronged because taking her car harms her
(maybe just slightly since she is very wealthy). Stealing her car makes her a bit worse off and is
thereby harmful in the comparative sense. However, she is not poorly off and her state cannot be
considered bad in an absolute sense. Thus, according to the non-comparative understanding the
billionaire is not harmed at all. 
Strict  comparative views of harm cannot  account for the alleged harm inflicted on future
people in cases like Pollution while the strict non-comparative verdict about cases like Stealing
from a Billionaire  is counter-intuitive. These are two of the acknowledged problems for strict
views.1 The standard comparative views have implausible implications, but it seems that the non-
comparative  alternative  is  not  a  viable  alternative  in  its  own  right.  It  has,  therefore,  been
suggested  that  a  successful  view  of  harm combines  both  senses  –  in  a  disjunctive  manner
(McMahan, 2013; Meyer, 2016; Woollard, 2012).2 Roughly put, the disjunctive view of harm
holds that someone is harmed if they are made worse off or if they are caused to be in a bad state.
Both sides are considered essential for correctly capturing the puzzling nature of harm and its
moral significance. McMahan writes: “[…] I suspect that a pluralist or disjunctive account of
harm,  which  includes  both  comparative  and  non-comparative  dimensions,  is  unavoidable”
(McMahan, 2013, p. 7). Since the disjunctive view can account for some of the most troublesome
cases for strict theories, for example Pollution and Stealing from a Billionaire, the motivation for
it is striking.   
There is a limited amount of literature about the disjunctive idea and even less discussion
about how to formulate a disjunctive account in more detail. This essay puts the disjunctive view
in the spotlight, explicitly outlines the structure of the disjunctive view and different versions of
it. The general aim is to examine the capacity of the disjunctive view and its place in moral
theorizing. More specifically, this essay (i) explores if we can avoid the problems with strict
1  Bradley (2012) and Rabenberg (2015) lead structured discussion about these difficulties. 
2 Theoretically, a combination account of harm can be conjunctive as well. That means that a necessary comparative
condition is combined with a necessary non-comparative view. This essay focues on disjunctive combination views
where each condition is sufficient. 
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views by disjunctively combining a comparative and a non-comparative condition of harm and
(ii) develops possible defence strategies to three objections that have been raised specifically
toward disjunctive views. There are many attempts to solve the problems with strict views in the
literature,  but  to  explore  the  opportunities  and  limitations  of  disjunctively  combining  the
conditions has only been done in relation to the Non-Identity Problem up until  now. Current
literature  contain  scattered discussions  about  possible  problems with  disjunctive views.  This
essay contributes by discussing if  and how the disjunctive view can be defended against the
objections raised toward it.
The outline of the essay is as follows: the next section explains the background for why and
how the concept of harm matters, presents some important distinctions and introduces desiderata
for evaluating different views of harm. In section 3, the strict views are presented as a part of
explaining the development of the disjunctive view.  Section 4 discusses three challenges for
disjunctive views and explores how they can be met. It is concluded, in section 5, that the debate
about the disjunctive view is starting to take shape, but important issues remain to be tackled.
2 Background
There is a vast amount of literature about harm. Considering the examples in the introduction, it
is easy to see why. Harm is something to care about because it is bad for a person to be harmed
and it provides a reason to morally criticize or condemn certain behavior. Here, I will provide a
background for the upcoming discussion by presenting some of the philosophical disciplines that
rely on  the  concept  of  harm and what  is  required of  an account  of  harm for  it  to  work  in
philosophical theorizing. I will also present some distinctions between different debates about
harm as well as different aspects of harm. That helps to pinpoint the dimension of harm that this
essay focuses on.
The  concept  of  harm  is  often  used  in  philosophical  theorizing.  In  contemporary  moral
deontology  efforts  are  made  to  justify  constraints  against  harming  others,  establishing
distinctions between doing and allowing harm as well as intending and foreseeing harm (Bradley,
2012, p. 391). The concept also has a central position in biomedical ethics, where one out of four
main principles is non-maleficence. This principle is explicated in terms of harm: “One ought not
inflict evil or harm“ (Beauchamp & Childress, 2013, p. 150). Debates within bioethics do not
only rely on the harm concept in general, but often on the standard comparative (counter-factual)
understanding. Discussions about alternative views have an influence on such debates.  “Since
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many arguments in applied ethics currently rely upon the counterfactual account of harm, any
deviation from this understanding of the concept is likely to have a large impact on contemporary
bioethical problems” (Purshouse, 2016, p. 252). Also, Mill's Harm Principle puts the concept of
harm in the spotlight. This principle states that the only rightful use of power over an individual
is to prevent significant harm to others (Purshouse, 2016, p. 251). More generally one might say
that these principles about harms limit what is considered acceptable behavior, for example, in
medical and political practices. 
Notably though, it is not only the concept of harm that is used in these contexts. Notions such
as  harming, causing harm, wrongful harming  and  significant harm  are all found frequently in
moral theorizing and common thought. This essay focuses on the more basic notion  harm or
being harmed. Feinberg explains why harm or being harmed is more fundamental than harming:
“In any event, the idea of a harmed condition seems more fundamental conceptually than an act
of harming, since one must mention harm in the explanation of what it is for one person to harm
another,  whereas  one  can  hope  to  analyze  the  idea  of  harm  (harmed  condition)  without
mentioning causally contributory actions”  (Feinberg, 1984, p. 31).3 This means that  harm and
harming are separable concepts and can be understood in different ways.4 Harm can be analyzed
by simply looking at a subject – a person that is harmed.5 Harming, on the other hand, involves a
subject  and an  agent  who has  caused or  is  responsible  for  the  subject's  suffering.  The  link
between agent and subject can be spelled out in different ways and can vary in complexity. I will
assume a simple link so that harming means causing someone harm.6
The different harm views in the literature do not only define what harm is,  they also say
something about how to measure degrees of harm and explain the badness of harm. Hanser
claims that a full account of harm includes the following: “(a) tell us what it is to suffer harm, (b)
explain why it is bad to suffer harm, and (c) give us some idea how to measure the relative
seriousness  of  different  harms”  (Hanser,  2008,  pp.  421–422). This  means  that  the  different
theories  provide  different  answers  to  these  questions.  Also,  a  theory that  does  not  provide
3 This point is perhaps less plausible about a non-comparative condition, see footnote 5.
4 Woollard  (2012) explicitly points  at  the possibility of  having different  conditions of  harm and harming.  For
example, Hanser (2009) combines a comparative conditions of harming with a non-comparative condition of harm.  
5 Bradley (2012) claims that a plausible concept of harm should not be exclusive to persons or humans (it applies to
other beings as well). In this essay I use terms as someone or a person being harmed, but I do not mean to claim that
harm is restricted to persons or humans. I remain silent with regards to that question. These terms are used for
simplicity reasons and none of the arguments discussed in this essay rely upon it. 
6 This is vague and will be left so intentionally. It is possible that the merits of one's view about harm depends upon
the view about  harming.  For example,  Hanser (2009) argues that a non-comparative condition of harm must be
accompanied with a counter-factual condition of harming to establish a link between agent and subject. However, the
scope of this essay does not allow for this aspect to be elaborated and this question will be set aside.
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answers can be considered incomplete. There is more on how to measure the theoretical worth of
different theories in the following discussion about desiderata. 
2.1 Desiderata
We  can  use  certain  desiderata  to  evaluate  and  compare  the  worth  of  different  accounts  in
philosophical  theorizing.  Evaluative  grounds  are  often  implicit  and  theories  are  said  to  be
counterintuitive,  ad  hoc  etc.,  which  are  features  commonly thought  of  as  valid  grounds  for
criticism. However, what makes things complicated is that the criteria depends on our view on
the concept's function. And there is no consensus about the harm concept's role or importance in
philosophical theorizing. 
Some claim that harm has a special importance in philosophical theorizing while others think
it has no part to play at all. Some question the harm concept's place in philosophical theorizing
due to the difficulties of formulating a plausible view. For example, Bradley (2012) argues that
the concept cannot be made plausible and ought to be abandoned:
The most widely discussed account, the comparative account, faces counterexamples that seem
fatal. But no alternative account has gained any currency. My diagnosis is that the notion of harm
is a Frankensteinian jumble. Thus it is unsuitable for use in serious moral theorizing  (Bradley,
2012, p. 391)
Bradley thinks that we should abandon the concept due to the problems with comparative and
non-comparative views. He claims that the axiological concepts of intrinsic and extrinsic badness
can  replace  harm.  For  example,  consequentialists  can  refer  to  the  intrinsic  disvalue  of
consequences and deontologists can appeal to the relevant notions for wronging, such as rights
violation,  inflicting pain etc.  Similarly,  Holtug (2002) questions the usage of the concept  by
arguing that neither comparative nor non-comparative conceptions of harm can make sense of
Mill's Harm Principle.
The non-skeptics generally think that the concept is needed for more than one purpose. In fact,
“[...] we need the concept of harm for both explanatory and predictive purposes (its theoretical
use), and to mark certain kinds of reasons for action and attitude (its normative use)” (Kahane &
Savulescu, 2012, p. 323). Harrosh explains the importance of identifying harms as follows: “the
ability to identify harms is imperative to thinking clearly about wrongdoing. In fact, it is through
the presence of harm that victims and wrongdoings are usually detected” (Harrosh, 2012, p. 493).
Purshouse expresses a similar opinion. “In order to determine whether a particular course of
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conduct is ethically permissible it is important to have a concept of what it means to be harmed”
(Purshouse,  2016,  p.  251).  It  is  clear  that  the harm concept  is  thought  to  have a theoretical
purpose as well as a normative purpose. This is also reflected in the more explicit remarks about
desiderata.
Bradley  (2012,  pp.  394–396) presents  a  helpful  (non-exhaustive)  list  of  desiderata  for
evaluating accounts of harm. It should be noted that the desiderata are plausibly not thought to be
absolute,  but  rather  desirable  features.  Perhaps  no  account  can  satisfy  all.  First,  and  quite
obviously, an account should adequately capture the extension of harm. Bradley calls this the
Extensional Adequacy desideratum, according to which “the analysis must fit the data” (Bradley,
2012, p. 394). “Fitting the data” is plausibly a measure of how well the account accords with
ordinary language and intuitions about harm. Since harm is a matter of degree, this desideratum
also requires that an account allows for an analysis of lesser and greater harms. 
The Normative Importance desideratum states that an account “should entail that harm is the
sort of thing that it makes sense for there to be deontological restrictions about” (Bradley, 2012,
p. 396). Two out of the three challenges discussed in this essay concern normative consequences
of adopting a disjunctive view. Therefore, the meaning of this desiderata needs to be elaborated
on further. The alternatives to claiming that harm is “normatively important” is to  claim that
harm is always wrong or that it is morally neutral. However, both these alternatives are thought
to misidentify immoral conduct (Harrosh, 2012, p. 497). According to the Amorality desideratum,
an account should not be formulated such that harming entails wronging. This seems plausible
since a subject can be harmed by natural causes. For example, earthquakes injure people and
packed snow can fall from a roof and hit someone on the street. There are no moral agents or
wrongdoers involved in such cases. A common way to understand the normative importance of
harm is that there is a pro tanto moral reason not to harm. This means that performing a harmful
act  can be justified all  things  considered,  but  the fact  that  it  harms always (morally)  counts
against it. As Rabenberg (2015) points out, this is more plausible than the alternatives above and
it does not conflict with Amorality. 
There  is  a  certain  tension  between  the  Extensional  Adequacy and  Normative  Importance
desiderata. The debate about the nature of harm tries to capture the ordinary usage of the concept
(to some extent), but that is not the sole purpose. Finding a perfect formulation for the dictionary
would not suffice, since the harm concept must work for normative purposes as well. Feinberg
tries to explain how we can find a balance between these considerations.
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The word “harm” is both vague and ambiguous […] But insofar as it is ambiguous, we must
select among its normal senses the one or ones relevant for our normative purposes, and insofar
as it is vague in those senses, it should be made more precise—a task that requires some degree
of stipulation, not simply a more accurate reporting of current usage (Feinberg, 1984, pp. 31–32).
It  might  be  difficult  to  find  this  balance,  but  the  tension  is  not  necessarily a  big  problem.
Satisfying  the  desiderata  are  plausibly  a  matter  of  degree.  Also,  as  mentioned  before,  the
desiderata are desirable features and not ultimate requirements. 
According to the Unity desideratum, an account should also sustain a core that explains what
all cases of harm have in common. For example, a list of things that seem bad - such as pain,
death, decreased mental and physical functioning etc – does not satisfy this requirement since it
is not obviously unified. Moreover, the Axiological Neutrality desideratum states that an account
should not presuppose any theory about well-being or the currency of harm. In everyday life we
think of harms as right violation, pain, death, ignorance, property loss and much more. Moral
philosophy usually uses well-being as the relevant currency in discussions about harm. There are
extensive  and  ongoing  debates  about  well-being,  often  including  the  main  theories  such  as
hedonism, desire-satisfaction and objective list theories  (Holtug, 2002). Therefore, figuring out
what counts as good and bad for a person is essential for a complete analysis of harm. However,
“[d]isputes about what makes for well-being are important, but not relevant to current disputes
about the nature of  harm” (Bradley, 2012, p. 392). The discussion here, involving comparative
and non-comparative views, is better thought of as handling the structural dimension of harm.
Roughly put, it  has been suggested that an account of harm should adequately capture the
extension  of  harm in  a  unified  manner.  Moreover,  an  account  should  entail  that  harms  are
normatively important without presupposing axiological commitments and in such a way that
harming does not entail wronging.  These desiderata will help evaluate the disjunctive view of
harm as an alternative to strict comparative and non-comparative theories.
3 The Development of the Disjunctive View
Relatively recently a disjunctive idea about harm has begun to take shape in the literature. The
hope is that a combination of both senses of harm can avoid the famous problems with strict
views.  Therefore,  this  section  starts  out  by presenting the  strict  views.  That  serves  the  dual
purpose  of  (i)  presenting  the  two  components  that  constitute  a  disjunctive  view  and  (ii)
presenting  the  problems  facing  the  strict  comparative  and  the  non-comparative  views.  This
7
3. The Development of the Disjunctive View
section explores the possibility of solving the problems by adopting a disjunctive view. However,
I do not mean to imply that it is impossible to solve them in other ways or that the problems are
fatal for the strict traditions. However, these problems are still debated and considered serious. It
is due to these problematic aspects (among others) that philosophers have started to doubt strict
views and consider disjunctive alternatives.  There are some proponents of disjunctive views in
the debate, but the formulation of the view is yet to be explicitly examined. This section presents
the structural basis of the disjunctive view and outlines alternative versions.
3.1 Comparative Harm
The comparative understanding of harm is  the most commonly embraced and considered the
standard view. In the comparative sense of harm someone is harmed if she is made worse off.
This means that her state is worse than the state she was in before or would have been in. Hence,
a condition for harm in a strict comparative view can be formulated as follows: 
Strict Comparative Condition: P is harmed iff P is made worse off.7
According to the strict comparative condition, the only way a person can be harmed is to be made
worse off. The comparative idea of harm is simple, but it can explain a variety of ordinary cases.
Everything from small harms like getting a blister on your hand to great harms such as people
loosing loved ones and homes due to natural catastrophes. The comparative condition also offers
a  straightforward  and  intuitive  explanation  of  why someone  is  harmed  both  including  and
excluding a moral wrongdoer. Getting your wallet stolen by someone on the bus or loosing your
eye sight due to an incurable medical condition both seem like harms even if the first is morally
objectionable and the other is not. 
Understanding harm in terms of being made worse off raises a question: worse compared to
what? What that worsening is a variation from is referred to as the  comparative baseline. The
comparative baseline is  an important  structural  feature of the comparative condition since it
settles what we are supposed to compare with. There are two main versions of comparative views
that are based on two different baselines:8
7 Petersen (2014, p. 200) offers a similar formulation. 
8 Petersen (2014, pp. 205–208) also considers what is called the Baseline from Mankind. It seems to be a mistake to
consider this an alternative baseline (at least in the sense it is understood here – as a mode of comparison). It  is
theoretically an  available  position,  but  it  is  highly implausible  and  no  one  is  embracing it.  Petersen considers
Harrosh (2012) a proponent, but it seems quite clear that her view includes both a historical and counter-factual
baseline: “By harm I understand a state in which we are worse off than we were or could have been relative to the
potential of our species to live a fully human life, that is, a life that is neither simply about being alive, nor about
existing and prospering as a biological organism” (Harrosh, 2012, pp. 493–494). This is rather a combination of the
two main baselines where “the potential to live a full life” is the prefered theory of well-being.
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Historical Baseline: P is harmed by X iff P is made worse off than P was prior to X.
Counter-factual Baseline: P is harmed by X iff P is made worse off than P would have been
in the absence of X.
These are two different modes of comparison – one picks out a state at another time and one
picks  out  a  state  in  another  possible  world.  The  historical  baseline  seems  useful  in  many
everyday cases (and perhaps in combination with a counter-factual baseline), but is considered
inferior to the counter-factual baseline.9 The historical baseline is unable to accommodate our
intuition about cases of the following kind: a nurse with cruel intentions makes sure that a patient
with terrible stomach aches does not get her scheduled pain killers. The patient does not get any
pain killers at t1 and therefore the painful state remains at t2. The patient is not harmed according
to a comparative view with a historical baseline, because she is not made worse off.10 Another
example of intuited harm that the historical baseline fails to account for is when someone is blind
from birth (Kahane & Savulescu, 2012). These shortcomings have led many to think that we
should not compare with what was, but rather with another possible world.  
The more popular counter-factual baseline is defended by for example Feit (2016), Klocksiem
(2012),  and  Purshouse  (2016).11 In  Feit's  words:  “It  is  widely acknowledged  that  the  most
plausible account […] is the counterfactual comparative account. A given event harms a person,
according  to  this  account,  provided  that  the  person  would  have  been  better  off,  all  things
considered, if the event had not occurred” (Feit, 2015, p. 361). According to the counter-factual
baseline the comparison is made with how the person's state would have been in the absence of
the act or event. Technically, this is commonly spelled out in terms of the nearest possible world:
“On this view, an event, e, constitutes a harm for S if and only if S is better off in the nearest
possible world in which e does not occur than she is in the relevant e-world” (Klocksiem, 2012,
p. 2). Hence, W1 (the world where the act is performed or the event takes place) is compared to
W2 (the closest possible world where that act or event is absent). This view gives the correct
9 One exception is Rabenberg (2015) who defends a version of the comparative view with a historical baseline. 
10 As Petersen (2014) discusses, this flaw motivates a more stable version of the historical baseline. On this version t1
is a time where things are normal for the patient. Then, if the state of terrible pain is not normal for the patient she is
in fact considered harmed. However,  this version is still  inferior to the counter-factual baseline. Aside from the
difficulty of specifying what the “normal” state is consider a patient who always is, and always has been, in pain. She
is now schedules for a procedure that will make her normal condition a painless one, but the nurse makes it so that
the procedure never takes place. According to the historical baseline, in this version, that does not harm the patient
which is a highly counter-intuitive verdict. 
11 Others, such as Bradley (2012) and Petersen (2014), argue that the counter-factual baseline is the best available
baseline, but express worries about the comparative counter-factual view.  
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verdict in many cases. The counter-factual analysis captures the harm that the nurse inflicts on
the patient. The patient's state is worse off than it would have been if the scheduled painkillers
were given to the patient.
It is important to note that this standard view plausibly incorporates the distinction between
overall harm and  pro  tanto harm since  many events  involve  both  benefits  and  harms.  For
example: “Eating poisoned candy might harm the one who eats it, for example, even if it results
in some very pleasurable sensations and so is a pro tanto benefit” (Feit, 2015, p. 361).12 Hence, in
the comparative framework a pro tanto harm is to be made worse off in some respect while
overall harmful events make someone worse off on the whole. 
The comparative views of harm are still the most popular, but they are also considered to have
serious problems. Some of the most frequently discussed problems are the Non-Identity Problem,
the Preemption Problem and the Omission Problem. They suggest that comparative views fail to
capture the harm of acts that future people's existence is contingent upon and acts which effects
would happen even if the act was not performed. Also, the comparative account finds harm in too
many cases if failing to benefit is considered a harm.
3.1.1 The Non-Identity Problem
It is challenging to put forward an account of harm that accommodates the intuition that we harm
future people by causing them suffering. That is made clear by the famous Non-Identity Problem
which  was  first  formulated  by  Parfit  (1984). Common  examples  of  non-identity  cases  are
environmental  policy choices that  will  affect  people inhabiting earth in a distant  future (like
Pollution presented in the introduction) and procreation choices with negative effects:
Child in Pain – a person with a genetic variation procreates at t1 which results in the child
getting an incurable medical condition. The condition will cause the child a lot of pain all
through her life. Although, overall, the life will be worth living. However, the effect of the
genetic variation could have been blocked if the person had gone through a small, painless
procedure and procreated at t2.
Before explaining why such cases pose a problem for comparative views it helps to note that the
Non-Identity Problem gets  its  fuel  from two underlying principles.  One normative  principle
12  The distinction can be understood in terms of overall and pro tanto and/or all-things-considered and prima facie.
For example, Klocksiem uses the latter two to explain how it is possible to benefit someone by genuinely harming
them  (Klocksiem, 2012,  p.  14). Here,  overall and  pro tanto will  be used.  For  simplicity and since the current
discussion does not depend on the slight differences in meaning between the terms.
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about the wrongness of harming and one stating that making someone worse off  is a necessary
condition for when an act harms.13
The Harm Principle: if an act X, harms a person P, that is a reason against performing X.
The Worse-Off Principle [WoP]: An act X, harms a person P, iff X makes P worse off.14
First of all, the reason mentioned in the harm principle is a moral one and plausibly a pro tanto
reason. This means that there is a moral reason against performing acts that harm, but there might
be other reasons in favor and against the same act.  Determining if  the act is  morally wrong
includes weighing all such considerations. Secondly, these principles help explain why acts are
harmful and why harming is wrong in many ordinary cases. Consider person A who physically
assaults person P resulting in P suffering lifelong pain. P is made worse off both in a historical
and counter-factual sense so the act harms P. Under normal circumstances (A knew what she did,
was not forced or threatened etc.) we can say that the act was wrong because there was a reason
against performing it, namely that it harmed P. We can thereby explain the wrongness of the act
in terms of the harm involved. 
Now, we turn to  Pollution and the  Child in Pain  which involve identity-affecting actions.
Many intuit that the future subjects are harmed and that is the reason for why the acts are wrong.
But these acts are not harmful according to WoP. If we try to figure out if the child is made worse
off (either with a historical or counter-factual baseline) it is clear that we must decide if P is
worse off in the scenario of the painful life than in the scenario of non-existence. In some cases
one might be inclined to say that non-existence would be better, but the assumption here is that
their lives are worth living overall. Consequently: “What the non-identity problem shows is then
that  we  cannot  appeal  to  harm  in  order  to  explain  why  certain  identity-affecting  acts  are
impermissible” (Algander, 2013, p. 13). Or more precisely, identity-affecting acts cannot be said
to be harmful in the comparative sense and so one cannot claim that they are morally wrong with
reference to a comparative view of harm.
13 Algander (2013, p. 14) presents the two underlying features as 1) The Harm Principle and 2) The Counterfactual
Condition. This presentation is similar, but broader because any comparative condition (both historical and counter-
factual versions) implies WoP. 
14 WoP and the Comparative Condition are strikingly similar. The difference is that WoP is formluated in terms of
acts.
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3.1.2 The Preemption Problem
The Preemption Problem regards scenarios where a given effect occurs in a possible world W1,
but also in  the nearest  possible  world W2 due to  there being two potential  and independent
causes. Notably, then, the problem concerns comparative views of the more common counter-
factual version and not historical versions. In Woollard's illustration of the problem a victim will
be killed by a second shooter if the first does not fire:
Shooting match: Through no fault of his own, Victor has made two terrible enemies, Adam and
Barney, who have both sworn deadly vengeance upon him. Barney is just about to shoot and kill
Victor. Barney is protected by a bullet-proof, sound-proof shield so that Adam can neither stop
him forcibly nor dissuade him. Adam knows this, but Victor’s death by another’s hand will not
satisfy his  thirst  for  vengeance.  Adam shoots  Victor  and Victor  dies from the bullet  wound.
(Woollard, 2012, p. 684)
Victor would have died even if Adam did not shoot him because Barney was just about to do it.
Therefore, Victor would not have been better off if Adam refrained from shooting hence he has
not been comparatively harmed. The implication that Victor has not been harmed by Adam is
counter-intuitive. Perhaps some think that Adam's act is somewhat less serious because Victor's
death could not have been avoided, but claiming that Victor has not been harmed at all by Adam's
action seems unacceptable. Since this problem regards all cases of preemption, the conclusion is
that comparative views (at least counter-factual ones) are under-inclusive. Meaning that it cannot
accommodate a category of cases we think of as harmful.
3.1.3 The Omission Problem 
The conclusion  of  the Omission  Problem  is  that  comparative  views  with  a  counter-factual
baseline find harm in too many cases. The problem is that failing to benefit seems distinct from
causing  harm,  but  the  counter-factual  comparative  framework  cannot  make  sense  of  the
difference between them. Consider Bradley's example below that I have simply named Batman:
[Batman:] Suppose Batman purchases a set of golf clubs with the intention of giving them to
Robin, which would have made Robin happy. Batman tells the Joker about his intentions. The
Joker says to Batman, ‘‘why not keep them for yourself?’’ Batman is persuaded. He keeps the
golf clubs. (Bradley, 2012, p. 397)
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Robin is harmed in the comparative sense since he would have been better off if Batman had
given him the golf clubs. This seems like the wrong verdict since:  “Merely failing to benefit
someone does not constitute harming that person. So there are cases where non-harmful events
are counted as harmful by the comparative account” (Bradley, 2012, p. 397). 
This problem is built on a couple of assumptions. One assumption is that omissions can cause
harm. It certainly seems plausible that omissions can be harmful when considering, for example,
not setting off the fire alarm if you see that a fire has started in a building full of people. There
are also normative assumptions regarding the relative weight of harms and benefits, which is
clear from Shiffrin's (1999) formulation of the problem. 
Shiffrin (1999) puts the problem in terms of a failure to account for the asymmetry between
harms and benefits. The root of the problem is that within the counter-factual framework benefits
and harms are thought to represent two ends of one scale. In other words, “[i]f he has ascended
the  scale  (either  relative  to  his  beginning  point  or  alternative  position),  then  he  has  been
benefitted.  If  he  moves  down,  then  he  has  been  harmed”  (Shiffrin,  1999,  p.  121).  This
symmetrical treatment  of harms and benefits  is  problematic in  the light  of our asymmetrical
intuitions:
First,  [the  counterfactual  model]  fails  to  accommodate,  much  less  explain,  some  deep
asymmetries between benefits and harms. For instance, we often consider failing to be benefited
as morally and significantly less serious than both being harmed and not being saved from harm.
This asymmetry is difficult to explain on a comparative model. For, within it, harming and failing
to prevent harm do not look so different from failing to benefit. Variants that identify harm and
benefit in terms of counterfactual comparison render them indistinguishable.  (Shiffrin, 1999, p.
121)
Failing to benefit cannot be distinguished from harming or failing to prevent harm, but intuitively
the two latter are more serious morally. For example, not throwing you a surprise birthday party
seems permissible even if that makes you worse off. But to ruin your party that is already taking
place, or failing to stop an angry and confused person from smashing the cake (if it is easily
done), is morally objectionable. There is no explanation for the moral seriousness of the two
latter if harms and benefits are each other's mirror images as the counter-factual model implies.
This  section  has  presented  three  of  the  most  serious  problems  directed  towards  the
comparative understanding of harm. Due to these problems, some philosophers have turned their
attention away from the standard view and towards alternative, non-comparative, views of harm.
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3.2 Non-Comparative Harm
Non-comparativists  criticize  the  idea  that  harm can  be  accounted  for  with  a  necessary and
sufficient  comparative condition.15 The underlying thought  is  that  some bad states  constitute
harms regardless of how things was or how they could have been. Being harmed is being in an
absolute bad state. Put in Algander's terms: “According to the basic structure, to do harm is to
make a person be in a harmful state; a state which is non-instrumentally bad for the person who
suffers it” (Algander, 2013, p. 63). Hence, according to a strict non-comparative view, a person is
harmed if the condition below is satisfied:
Strict Non-comparative Condition: P is harmed iff P is caused (allowed) to be in a bad
state.16
An essential part of non-comparative views is the threshold that defines what a bad state is. Due
to that, these views are also referred to as the “threshold notion of harm” (Meyer, 2016). Spelling
out the threshold, and what counts as a harmed state, can be done in different ways. This aspect
will  not  be  much  discussed  here,  since  it  has  more  to  do  with  the  axiological  dimension.
However,  a  couple of  views will  be presented briefly because it  can help to  grasp the non-
comparative sense of harm.17 According to Harman, the non-comparative threshold should be
spelled out in terms of a healthy bodily state. “At least, an action harms someone if it causes the
person to be in a state, or to endure an event, that is worse than life with a healthy bodily state”
(Harman, 2004, pp. 96–97). Shiffrin suggests that a harmed state is one where things are not in
line with one's will. “On my view, harm involves conditions that generate a significant chasm or
conflict between one’s will and one’s experience, one’s life more broadly understood, or one’s
circumstances” (Shiffrin, 1999, p. 123). In many cases these two understandings will generate the
15 Note that not everyone who advocates the non-comparative understanding of harm does so by proposing a strict
non-comparative view – with a necessary and sufficient non-comparative condition. The debate is perhaps better
described as between proponents of standard strict comparative views and their critics (who are not all proponents of
strict non-comparative views). But in order to grasp the development of the disjunctive idea and present its parts, the
strict non-comparative understanding of harm will also be presented together with serious problems directed at it.
16 Algander (2013) puts the non-comparative condition in a different way: “ an act ϕ  harms a person b only if b is
worse off than she would be in a baseline situation, S”  (Algander, 2013, p. 64). However, he explains that: “The
idea,  according to  this view, is  that  to harm someone is to  make the person worse off in some sense,  but  not
necessarily worse off than the person would otherwise have been. It is still warranted, I think, to call this view 'non-
comparative' because the way in which harms make life go worse is just the way in which bad things make life go
worse. That is, the non-comparative element, that to do harm is to cause a person to suffer a state of affairs which is
bad in itself for the person, is primary”  (Algander, 2013, p. 64). The non-comparative view might involve some
comparative aspects. For example, being in a bad state makes life go worse.
17 Except from the two examples that follow in the text, it might be useful to note that Meyer (2016) discusses non-
comparative views that define the threshold in terms of egalitarianism, prioritarianism and sufficientarians in the
context of intergenerational justice.
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same verdict, but not always. For example, (depending on how we are to understand “a healthy
bodily state”) leading a happy life with impaired eye sight seems to satisfy Harman's condition. If
that is a harmed state on Shiffrin's view depends on if the life one leads is in line with one's will.
There are clear differences between these views, but they share the same structural build-up (as
outlines above) which means that they explain harm in terms of being in a bad state.
The non-comparative notion of harm can account for intuitions about identity-affecting acts,
preemption cases and omission in a quite straight forward manner. That is not surprising given
that the problems are premised on comparative features and also since non-comparative views
developed in the light  of  these issues.  It  can be said that  causing future people suffering in
identity-affecting  cases  is  wrong  because  there  is  a  harm-based  reason  against  it.  Consider
Harman on the solution to the Non-Identity Problem: “More generally, my view is that there is a
reason against any action that would harm a person, and there is a reason in favor of any action
that would benefit a person. These individualistic reasons can explain the moral facts in non-
identity cases” (Harman, 2004, p. 108). The subjects in Child in Pain and Pollution are caused to
be in a bad state and thereby harmed in the non-comparative sense. Additionally, there is another
course of action available (stopping the pollution or conceiving another healthy child) that does
not involve the same harm. 
Second, the Preemption Problem does not target non-comparative notions of harm since it
does not rely on a counter-factual analysis. For example, the fact that someone else would have
shot Victor in  Shooting Match  is irrelevant and Victor is non-comparatively harmed (if being
dead  is  a  bad  state).  Thirdly,  consider  Shiffrin's  explanation  of  how  the  non-comparative
understanding of harm is better equipped to deal with asymmetrical intuitions, and thereby the
Omission Problem: 
Accounts that identify harms with certain absolute,  noncomparative conditions (e.g.,  a list  of
evils like broken limbs, disabilities, episodes of pain, significant losses, death) and benefits with
an  independently identified  set  of  goods  (e.g.,  material  enhancement,  sensual  pleasure,  goal-
fulfillment, nonessential knowledge, competitive advantage) would not generate these puzzles.
Structurally, they would be better placed to accommodate these asymmetries  (Shiffrin, 1999, p.
123)
Being “not benefited” is not the same as being non-comparatively harmed, since that does not
necessarily  make  your  state  bad.  Non-comparativists  are  capable  of  accommodating
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asymmetrical   intuitions  about  the  moral  significance  of  harms  and  benefits.  Therefore,  the
Omission Problem does not target a non-comparative understanding.
However, a strict non-comparative understanding of harm raises serious worries of its own. It
is commonly argued that the absoluteness of the non-comparative condition fails to capture a
context-sensitive notion of harm needed to explain our intuitions about cases above and below
the  threshold.  These  two  problems  are  known  as  the  Sur-Threshold  Problem  and  the  Sub-
Threshold Problem. Additionally, (if death is harmful) non-comparativists lack an explanation for
why death is harmful since being deprived of something is a comparative notion – here called
The  Death  Problem.  Notably,  these  problems  are  specific  for  non-comparative  views.  The
comparative condition is context-sensitive and can capture the harm of deprivation as well as
both small and great losses.
3.2.1 The Sur-Threshold Problem
It is argued that strict non-comparative views have counter-intuitive implications about cases that
involve a change, for better or worse, in the realms above and below the threshold (Rabenberg,
2015,  pp.  5–7). Roughly  put,  the  Sur-Threshold  Problem is  that  non-comparativists  cannot
account for harm that consists of a worsening that does not cause the person's state to be below
the threshold. Therefore, the non-comparative views cannot account for our intuition about cases
in the following spirit:
Genius Suffering Brain Damage – A genius has a stroke and suffers severe brain damage.
The damage to her brain puts her closer to a statistically normal cognitive functioning.
Even if she is still well above average the loss is substantial and she cannot live her life the
same way she did before the stroke.18
The loss to the genius is severe, but the non-comparative sense cannot capture the intuited harm
because her state is still sur-threshold. It is true that her state might be much better than mine and
yours, but the decrease of cognitive functioning seems to have harmed her. The same reasoning
goes for Stealing From a Billionaire. Again, we assume that the billionaire's loss affects her state
negatively but her state is still above the threshold. It is intuitively plausible to claim that the
genius and the billionaire are harmed, but any loss that does not make a person's state sub-
18 This example is similar to Hanser's (2008, p. 432) and he claims that it is a shortcoming of most non-comparative
views that they cannot make sense of the harm caused in this type of case. 
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threshold  slips  under  the  non-comparative  radar,  so  to  speak.  It  is  concluded  that  the  non-
comparative condition fails to capture losses above the threshold. 
3.2.2 The Sub-Threshold Problem
Similarly, it has also been argued that it fails to properly analyze gains below the threshold. The
Sub-Treshold Problem accuses non-comparative sense accounts of finding harm where there is
none. Consider an act that makes someone better off, but whose state is still below the threshold: 
Patient in Less Pain – A patient has a chronic painful condition. The doctor does the best
she can which is to prescribe painkillers. That makes the pain decrease, but not go away. 
It  is  assumed that  the  patient's  state  is  sub-threshold to  begin with.  The doctor  changes  the
patient's state from very poor to less poor. In other words, the state is made better, but it is still
sub-threshold. Most people probably intuit that there is nothing morally objectionable about the
doctor's behavior. The problem is that the non-comparative condition is satisfied, since the doctor
causes the patient to be in a sub-threshold state. The condition is satisfied even if the new sub-
threshold state is not as bad as the previous. It seems like the fact that someone is made better
off, even if she is still sub-threshold, changes our intuitions about harm. Similarly, the previous
section showed that a loss affect our intuitions even when someone's state remains sur-threshold.
The absolute nature of strict non-comparative views are unable to account for that.
3.2.3 The Death Problem
It has been argued that one of the most serious problems with the non-comparative understanding
is  that  it  cannot  account  for  the  greatest  harm  of  all  –  death  (Bradley,  2012;  Feit,  2015).
According to Feit, this problem constitutes one of the most compelling reasons for favoring a
comparative account over a non-comparative:
[…] non-comparative accounts of harm fail to account adequately for the harm of death. To take
just one example, consider the view that an event harms a person if and only if it causes her to be
in an intrinsically bad state (i.e., a “harmed state”). There is no plausible theory of value, to my
mind at least, on which it is intrinsically bad for a person to be dead, and so this view cannot
account for the harm of death (Feit, 2015, p. 362).
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Adequately accounting for the harm of death is notoriously difficult, but it is argued that the non-
comparative side completely lacks the tools to explain why death is be harmful.19 The thought is
that  any  attempt  to  explain  why  death  is  harmful  with  reference  to  the  non-comparative
framework is doomed to fail: “On a non-comparative account, we cannot appeal to the lost goods
of life to explain this, and thus we cannot account for the harm of death, for if death is harmful, it
must be in virtue of what it prevents its victim from having” (Bradley, 2012, p. 401). According
to the argument, it is the prevention or deprivation of a good life that makes death harmful, but
those  are  comparative  notions.  Admittedly,  it  seems  confused  to  think  that  you  have  been
deprived of X if you have not had X before or if there is no scenario (or possible world) in which
you would have had  X. It is concluded that the harm of death and “ by extension, events that
cause  death,  such  as  killings”  (Bradley,  2012,  p.  401) can only  be  explained  within  the
comparative framework. Since the alleged common intuition is  that  death is  a (great)  harm,
failing to explain the harm of death is a failure to capture the extension of harm.
Both the comparative and non-comparative tradition have appealing aspects and numerous
proponents. However, this section has brought to attention some of the serious problems that
strict  views face. Some have reacted to these problems by questioning both tradition.  “Non-
comparative accounts are plausible only as partial accounts of pro tanto harm. But comparative
accounts  are  not  fully  satisfactory  either.  The  counterfactual  account  has  problems  with
preemption and omission” (Bradley, 2012, p. 410). This leads Bradley to be skeptical about using
the harm concept in moral theorizing. Others have suggested that the nature of harm is twofold
and a successful view must combine the conditions in a disjunctive manner.
3.3 The Disjunctive View: A Solution?
Like all hybrid and combinatory accounts, the disjunctive view of harm is based on the idea that
both sides are essential for getting things right. More specifically, it has been suggested that by
adopting a disjunctive view of harm one can avoid the problems for strict views. This section
explores  this  claim.  Disjunctive  views  combine  a  sufficient  comparative  condition  and  a
sufficient non-comparative condition:
The Disjunctive View of Harm: P is harmed iff, (i) P is made worse off or (ii) P is caused
(allowed) to be in a bad state.
19 It can be argued that all theories share the problem relating to the harm of death. For example, it has been argued
that “[i]f the dead fare neither well nor badly[..]” (Hanser, 2008, p. 437) then no state-based view can account for the
harm of death. If that is correct, then both comparative and non-comparative accounts face this problem. However,
the problem at issue here is that even if one can counter Hanser's argument (and others like it), the non-comparativist
still lacks the tools to explain why death is harmful.
18
3. The Development of the Disjunctive View
On  the  disjunctive  account,  harms  are  either  comparative,  non-comparative  or  both.  What
disjunctive views hold in more details will depend on at least four aspects. First, the preferred
understanding of the comparative condition (counter-factual or historical baseline, alternatively
one can include both which would mean that the disjunctive view has three disjuncts). Second,
the preferred understanding of the non-comparative threshold. Third (and possibly related to the
previous aspect), the preferred view on the axiology of harm. Finally, the fourth aspect is the
relation between the conditions. The relation can be understood as additive according to which
the harm is dual if both types of conditions are satisfied or non-additive where, for example, the
non-comparative component is silent if the comparative condition is satisfied. This aspect will be
discussed in section 4.1. Other than that, this essay remains neutral regarding these aspects and
focuses on what can be said about the abstract structure of the concept above. It would be an
interesting  project  to  discuss  and  analyze  the  virtues  and  vices  of  different  versions  of  the
disjunctive view, but that will not be done here. 
McMahan argues that the combination of a comparative (counter-factual) condition and a non-
comparative  condition  is  necessary for  capturing  all  harms.  The harm of  all  sorts  of  losses
(including death) are accounted for by the comparative condition, but “a full account of benefit
and harm will have to recognize both comparative and noncomparative benefits and harms, since
most existential benefits and harms are essentially noncomparative” (McMahan, 2013, p. 7). The
non-comparative condition captures the harm of being in a state that is just plain bad (including
those caused by identity-affecting events which McMahan calls  existential  harms).  Similarly,
Meyer thinks that the disjunctive view is to prefer because “[t]he advantage of the disjunctive
notion is that this view of harm allows us to rely on the subjunctive-historical notion of harm
whenever it is applicable, that is, when we will harm an existing person” (Meyer, 2016, Chapter
3.4).20 However, the “subjunctive-historical notion” is  a historical version of the comparative
condition. According to Meyer, the disjunctive view is superior to strict theories since adopting a
non-comparative  threshold  condition  avoids  objections  directed  towards  the  comparative
condition.  At  the  same time,  we can  rely on the  comparative notion  (here with  a  historical
baseline) when existing people are harmed – thereby avoiding the problems for a strict  non-
comparative condition. Thus, an important motivation for the disjunctive view is that its capacity
20 Meyer  (2016) understands  the  non-comparative  conception  in  terms  of  a  sufficientarian  idea  about  justice.
However, that will not affect the discussion here since it shares the common structure of non-comparative conditions
(X is harmed if X is caused to be in a bad state). 
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to capture the extension of harm is greater, since it is able to account for the harm we intuit in the
various cases. 
Moreover, Woollard (2012) claims that both theoretical considerations and intuitive judgments
pull us between the comparative and the non-comparative sense of harming. “The clear moral
significance of people’s overall welfare pushes us towards the overall-comparison understanding
of harming. The importance of the relationships we stand in to others pushes us towards the non-
comparative understanding of harm” (Woollard, 2012, p. 688). According to Woollard, we should
respond to this by embracing a disjunctive notion where both senses of harming constitute moral
reasons. 
How the disjunctive combination resolves the tension and avoids the problems for strict views
has not yet been fully explained. This is problematic since strict views are accused of failing to
capture the extension of harm both due to under-inclusiveness (does not capture harm where we
intuit it) and over-inclusiveness (find harms in too many cases). A disjunctive view seems to
easily avoid problems of under-inclusiveness. The comparative condition captures harm that the
non-comparative condition fails to capture. Thereby, the disjunctivist can say that non-identity
cases and preemption cases are non-comparative harms. Also, the comparative condition captures
the harm we intuit in sur-threshold cases and death. However, something more needs to be said
regarding over-inclusiveness.  The Omission Problem and the Sub-Threshold Problem conclude
that strict views find harm where we do not intuit it. It is not as clear that a combination of two
conditions avoids such problems. Initially it might even seem as disjunctive views inherit them.
The Sub-Threshold Problem targets the non-comparative condition and concludes that people
are harmed if their states are sub-threshold, even if they are made better off. The intuitive verdict
of Patient in Less Pain seems to be that the patient is not harmed – rather she is benefited. The
disjunctive  analysis  will  hold  that  she  is  non-comparatively  harmed  as  long  as  the  non-
comparative condition is sufficient. Combining it with a comparative condition does not seem to
change that. The disjunctivist seems unable to reject that there is non-comparative harm involved
in cases where someone is made better off, but still poorly off. However, that is not necessarily
implausible considering that she is still badly off and there seems to remain a reason to help her.
On the other hand, an account should be able to help explaining why the doctor's action seems
morally right. The disjunctivist can do that by claiming that refraining from the act would have
harmed the patient comparatively and the patient is made better off counter-factually. Hence, by
referring to the comparative condition the disjunctivist can explain the intuition that the doctor's
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behavior is morally correct. At the same time the non-comparative side of the disjunctive view
explains why we have a moral reason to continue helping her, based on the fact that she is still in
a non-comparatively bad state.
The Omission Problem is based on the thought that counter-factual comparative views cannot
distinguish between failing to make someone better off and causing someone to be worse off.
This is thought to be problematic since it is normally intuited that we have a stronger moral
reason to prevent  or avoid harms than we have to  provide benefits.  Now, that  asymmetrical
intuition is hard to explain within the counter-factual model where harms and benefits operate on
the same scale and are mirror images. The non-comparative side has the capacity to explain the
intuited  asymmetry.  But  what  does  this  say about  the  disjunctive  analysis  of  cases  such  as
Batman? A disjunctive combination of the conditions does not seem to avoid the problem since
the verdict of the counter-factual condition stands – harms are mirror images of comparative
benefits. As long as Robin's state satisfies the comparative condition, the disjunctive views will
imply that he is comparatively harmed. Notably, the Omission problem targets comparative view
with a counter-factual baseline, therefore it is possible that disjunctive views with a historical
baseline  (and perhaps  views  that  combine a  historical  and a  counter-factual  baseline  on the
comparative  side  of  the  disjunct)  escapes  this  issue.  However,  the  historical  baseline  is
considered seriously problematic, as discussed in section 3.1.
There is another potential problem with trying to solve the problems by combining the two
conditions. This relates to both death and preemption. The disjunctivist can explain the harm of
death with reference to the comparative condition while the non-comparative condition captures
the  harm in  preemption  cases.  The problem is  that  this  does  not  enable  the disjunctivist  to
account for the harm in deadly preemption cases, such as Shooting Match. Presumably, leaving
deadly preemption cases unsolved would be too big of a cost. The disjunctivist can seek solutions
within the strict frameworks.21 In any case, the idea that simply combining the conditions enables
us to avoid the serious problems for strict views seems too optimistic.
It should be underlined that it is possible that the problems with strict views can be solved
within the respective frameworks (or in other ways), but this section has explored the possibility
of solving the problems by combining the conditions. Disjunctive views (with a counter-factual
condition) seem to inherit the Omission Problem and they are problematic in relation to deadly
preemption cases. However, the disjunctive combination of the strict conditions seems to handle
21 For example, it might be argued that the comparative sense can accommodate preemption cases, using “the plural
harm approach” (Feit, 2015, p. 362).
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the Non-Identity Problem, the Preemption Problem, the Sur-Threshold Problem and the Death
Problem in a straight forward manner. The disjunctivist can also explain how the combination
avoids the Sub-Threshold Problem. All in all, the capacity of the disjunctive view is promising,
since it is well equipped in terms of being able to accommodate intuitions about the discussed
types of  cases  or,  in  other words,  to  satisfy the extensional  adequacy desideratum to a  high
degree.
4 Challenges for the Disjunctive View
Adopting a disjunctive view is one way of avoiding many of the problems for strict views, but
the previous section argued that the disjunctive combination does not escape all problems. In
addition to  this,  it  has  been argued that  disjunctive views (i)  are incompatible  with the No-
Difference View, (ii) cannot fully respond to the Non-Identity Problem and (iii)  fail  to unify
harms. The motivation for the disjunctive strategy is weakened if these are serious problems.
This section sets out to address the three objections and explore possible solutions.
4.1 The No-Difference View
Meyer (2016) suggests that a possible problem for the disjunctive view is that it is incompatible
with Parfit's No-Difference View.22 Parfit's view states that our reason to prevent harm to possible
future people is as strong as our reason to prevent harm to actual people (Meyer, 2016).23 This
claim is  supported  by a  hypothetic  choice  between  two  medical  programs.  The  question  is
whether  there  is  any  morally  relevant  difference between  the  options.  Consider  the  choice
between the J-Program and K-Program below:
22 In relation to the No-Difference View, Meyer discusses this version of the disjunctive view: “[…] An action (or
inaction) at time t1 harms someone only if either [...] the agent thereby causes (allows) this person to be in a sub-
threshold state, and, if the agent cannot avoid causing harm in this sense, does not minimize the harm; or […] the
agent causes this person to be worse off at some later time t2 than the person would have been at t2 had the agent not
interacted  with this  person at  all“  (Meyer,  2016,  Chapter  3.4). The first  condition is  non-comparative  with an
additional clause about minimizing harm in case non-comparative harm cannot be avoided. The second condition is a
comparative condition with a counter-factual baseline.
23 Meyer (2016, Chapter 3.4) distinguishes between the practical version of the No-Difference View (that I discuss)
and the theoretical version. On the latter understanding there is no theoretical difference between preventing harm to
possible future people and actual people - we have the same reasons in each case. That is, in a direct manner,
incompatible with the disjunctive view, but using that as an objection is question-begging in this context. First of all,
it is doubtful that thought-experiment lends support to the strong claim that there is no theoretical difference between
preventing harm to possible future people and actual people. Without independent support for the No-Difference
View (theoretical version), there is no reason to accept it. Moreover, the disjunctive view has independent support, as
we have seen in this essay. 
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Medical  Programs: There  are  two separate  medical  programs,  the  J-Program and K-
Program. One of them needs to be canceled due to shortage of funds. These programs are
concerned with two medical conditions,  J and  K, which both afflict mothers-to-be and
both result  in  the future child  having the same functional  impairment.  J is  tested on
pregnant people and is curable, while K tested on people who intend to become pregnant
and incurable but disappears without intervention after, at the most, two months. Both
programs are scheduled to test millions of people and either cure pregnant women with J
or tell the women with  K to postpone conceiving for two months. The result of each
program is that 1000 children per year are born without the impairment.24 
Parfit  (1984) thinks  the  intuitive  response  is  that  it  does  not  matter  morally  which  of  the
programs will get the funds and which one will be canceled. This intuition motivates the No-
Difference View. 
Now,  what  would  a  disjunctivist  say  about  the  options?  Cancelling  the  J-Program  does
comparative harm since the J-children are worse off if their mothers medical condition is not
cured (they will then have the functional impairment). Canceling the K-Program will not make
any children worse off because it is an identity-affecting action and, as previously discussed, the
comparative condition is not satisfied in such cases. It is assumed the children's states are sub-
threshold  due  to  the  impairment  and canceling the  K-Program would  thereby result  in  non-
comparative harm. However, if the K-children's states are sub-threshold due to the impairment,
that must be true for the J-children as well. That leaves us with the following result: it is both
comparatively and  non-comparative  harmful  to  cancel  the  J-Program,  while  it  is  only non-
comparatively harmful to cancel the K-Program.25 Presumably, a disjunctivist would claim that
non-comparative  harms  provide  moral  reasons,  with  individual  weight,  over  and  above  the
involved comparative harms. This means that canceling the J-Program is more objectionable and
that there is a stronger moral reason to fund the J-Program. That contradicts the No-Difference
View. According to Parfit (1984), the most common intuitive response is that there is no morally
relevant  difference  between  the  programs.  If  that  is  the  case,  then,  this  implication  of  the
disjunctive view is counterintuitive.
Before exploring how the disjunctivist can respond to this, note that the objection is built on a
controversial  premise.  It seems to be assumed that harm-based reasons are the only relevant
24 This example is due to Parfit and is similar to his formulation (Parfit, 1984, p. 367).
25This also means that strict comparative views are incompatible with the No-Difference View while strict non-
comparative are not.  
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determinants of the choices' moral status. At least, harm plays the essential explanatory role for
the moral analysis. It can be argued that other reasons and considerations are essential to the
moral analysis (for example, rights). That would not alter the analysis in terms of harm, but it
would alter the overall moral analysis. It is possible that this claim is plausible and it  might
neutralize the objection. However, Meyer's potential objection will be treated as sound in this
discussion. Thereby, this discussion seeks to answer the question: if the objection is sound, how
can the disjunctivist respond to it? 
It  should  also  be  noted  that  this  displays  a  special  problem  for  disjunctive  views.  The
disjunctive  view is  especially vulnerable  to  troubles  of  weighing the  relative  seriousness  of
different harms, since the disjunctive analysis involves two kinds of harm. (As discussed in the
background,  a  complete  account  should  explain  how  we  are  to  measure  the  seriousness  of
different harms.)  This is unique for disjunctive views. On other views all harms satisfy the same
condition (either comparative or non-comparative) or two conditions (conjunctive combination
views). The disjunctivist must tell us how to measure the seriousness of non-comparative harms
against comparative harms. More specifically, is a choice of action more objectionable if it harms
in both senses than one that harms in one sense – like in the medical programs?
 There  are  two  main  strategies  to  respond  to  the  worry  that  the  disjunctive  view  is
incompatible with the No-Difference View. Firstly, one can reject that the disjunctive view places
more  weight  on  dual  harm than  on  single  harm.  In  other  words,  this  understanding of  the
disjunctive view is  nonadditive.26 For example, one can hold that the conditions are lexically
ordered and if there is comparative harm, then, the non-comparative harm does not add anything
extra. This is a simple and straight-forward solution, but what motivates it? Keeping in mind that
both conditions are sufficient in the disjunctive view, one needs to explain why one type of harm
can cancel out the other. The second strategy is to argue that verdict of the additive version of the
disjunctive view is plausible and dual harm is more objectionable than single harm. This strategy
contradicts the No-Difference View, but it also brings a new position to the table. Parfit does not
consider this position when he argues for the No-Difference View and an impersonal principle in
favor of a person-affecting principle.27
26 The  term  nonadditive is  borrowed from  DeGrazia  (2012,  p.  185), although he  does  not  discuss  the sort  of
disjunctive view that is in focus here. However, he uses the term to describe the same type of relation between
person-affecting components and impersonal components in a hybrid view.
27 It should be noted that Parfit does not explicitly discuss harm, but he discusses morally relevant reasons of which
harms are a subset.
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As Parfit sets the stage, there are two approaches to Medical Programs: either a strong person-
affecting  principle  (built  on  a  comparative  understanding)  or  the  impersonal  No-Difference
principle  (beyond the comparative and non-comparative)  which he prefers.  According to  the
former, there is no reason for funding the K-Program since the not-yet-conceived children only
risk  non-comparative  harm.  Therefore,  I  refer  to  it  as  the  Difference  View.28 Moreover,  for
illustrative purposes it can be thought of as scoring the programs with 1-0. The J-Program is of
moral importance due to the comparative harm involved in canceling it and is scored 1 point, but
the K-Program is not and scores 0 points. The programs are scored 1-1 on the No-Difference
View since the moral reasons at play are equal. If our choice is limited to these two approaches I
agree that the No-Difference View is more intuitive than the Difference View. The Difference
View cannot avoid the Non-Identity Problem and it is counter-intuitive in the light of  Medical
Programs  (since according to that no one is harmed if the K-program is canceled). However,
bringing the disjunctive sense of harm to the table gives us a third option – the Some-Difference
View.
The Some-Difference View holds that there is a harm-based moral reason against canceling
both programs,  but  not  equally strong reasons.  The disjunctive view gives  this  verdict  since
canceling the J-Program harms both comparatively and non-comparatively while canceling the
K-Program only harms in the latter sense. That constitutes  some moral difference between the
programs. Again, for illustration, it can be thought to score the J-Program with 1 point and the K-
Program with above 0 but below 1. Parfit seems correct in claiming that the No-Difference View
is more intuitive than the Difference View, but what about the Some-Difference View? First,
anyone who intuits that identity-affecting cases can be harmful would likely agree that the Some-
Difference View is more intuitive than the Difference View. Second, McMahan (2013) argues
that considerations about benefit gives us reason to adopt a disjunctive idea in favor of the No-
Difference View. 
McMahan supports a disjunctive view of benefits that acknowledges both a comparative and a
non-comparative sense as reason-giving in their own right. He argues that the verdict of this view
is more intuitive than the No-Difference View when considering a choice in the following spirit:
Choice A: Choice B:
P1  will exist in the future and live to 80 P1  will never exist
P2  will never exist P2  will exist in the future and live to 60 
28 The term ”Difference View” is not used by Parfit. I use it to illustrate the options that he considers and to show that
there is a third option.
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P3, who currently exists, will live to 60 P3, who currently exists, will live to 80
First, only one course of action can be chosen and it is assumed that all lives involved are worth
living. In both A and B person P3 exists, but her life is either 60 or 80 years long. The possible
person P1 will live to 80 in choice A while the possible person P2 will live to 60 in choice B.
Secondly,  there  are  three  different  approaches  to  this  choice.  If  we  only  acknowledge
comparative harm, and not non-comparative harm, we end up with the  Difference View –  that
there  is  reason  in  favor  of  choice  B but  no  reason  in  favor  of  A.  The  reason  is  that  it  is
comparatively better  for P3 to live 20 years longer while P1 and P2 are irrelevant on a strict
comparativist  analysis.  Secondly,  according  to  the  No-Difference  View  our  reasons  for  and
against the choices are equal. It does not matter if the existing P3 is provided the benefit of living
20 years longer or if we bring a person with a longer life to existence instead of bringing a person
with a shorter life to existence. According to McMahan, this shows that the No-Difference view
is counter-intuitive: “[...] it would be wrong to allow an existing person to die when he could live
an additional 20 years, in order instead to do what would cause a longer-lived person to come
into existence rather than a different, shorter-lived person” (McMahan, 2013, p. 13). The most
intuitive approach is the third alternative which holds that there is some difference between the
choices. The disjunctive view offers such an alternative. 
According to the Some-Difference View there are reasons in favor of both choices, but the
comparative benefit provided to P3 weighs heavier than the non-comparative benefit of bringing
the longer-lived P1 to existence. Therefore, the disjunctive view says that we should choose B
where the existing person gets a longer life. That verdict goes against the No-Difference View,
but is also the intuitively correct answer according to some. From this reasoning I conclude that
even if the disjunctive view is understood so that it is incompatible with the No-Difference view,
that is not necessarily a shortcoming. The disjunctive view does not imply the counter-intuitive
Difference View, but the Some-Difference View which has intuitive support.
4.2 The Non-Identity Problem
Woollard (2012) argues that acknowledging non-comparative harms only partly solves the Non-
Identity problem.  Roughly put,  our  concern  for  future  people  can  be outweighed by that  of
current people (as the reason to aid the J-Children could outweigh the reasons to aid the K-
Children, in the previous section). Notably, this will affect all disjunctive accounts since it is the
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non-comparative condition that can explain the harm in non-identity cases. This would mean that
my previous claim, that the disjunctive view is a straightforward solution to the Non-Identity
Problem, was premature.
According to Woollard, non-comparative harms are more easily justified than comparative
harms and can be outweighed by benefits.  She shows this  by considering a preemption case
similar to Shooting Match, but with a twist:
Saving Sarah: This time Adam has no grudge against Victor. Barney is just about to shoot and kill
Victor. Adam has no way of preventing this. Sarah is about to die. Adam can save her but doing
so  would  have  the  side-effect  that  he  kills  Victor.  Adam saves  Sarah’s  life  and  kills  Victor
(Woollard, 2012, p. 685).29
Victor  is  thought  to  be  non-comparatively  harmed  and  Sarah  is  (comparatively)  benefited.
Furthermore, the non-comparative sense in which Victor is harmed can be justified by the benefit
provided to Sarah. If Victor would have been harmed in a comparative sense (in a case where he
would not have died anyway), then the benefit provided to Sarah would not justify the harming
of Victor (Woollard, 2012, p. 687). Keeping that in mind, and considering Pollution and Child in
Pain again, it seems as if comparative benefits provided to current people can justify the non-
comparative  harms  future  people  will  suffer.  This  is  simply  because  benefits,  such  as  job
opportunities at the polluting factories and the parent's joy of conceiving a child, are able to
outweigh the future non-comparative harms. Non-comparative harm is simply not serious enough
to outweigh the benefits that identity-affecting acts can provide. The Non-Identity Problem is not
fully solved, because our intuited obligation to future subjects is still not accounted for.
It should be noted that this challenge is based on a couple of assumptions, partly about what
role harm plays in the moral analysis of these types of cases. Woollard defends the distinction
between allowing and doing harm. She rejects Parfit's  principle of beneficence (Principle Q),
according to which the environment should not be damaged because people are worse off than
those who otherwise would have lived and that makes it worse overall. Instead, Woollard argues
that we need a person-affecting explanation (based on harm and benefit). Hence, it is assumed
that (defeatable) harm-based and benefit-based reasons play a major role for the moral analysis.
Woollard's worry raises questions: assuming that harms need and can be justified, how are we
supposed to  measure the weight  of  comparative harms against  non-comparative harms? Can
29 If we accept the conclusion of the Death Problem it is incorrect to say that Victor's death is a non-comparative
harm. However, it makes no difference for the relevant argument that the example involves death. The argument
would still stand even if  the example was changed so that Victor is not shot to death, but instead severly injured.
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benefits justify harms? If so, when? Woollard claims that non-comparative harm normally have
less  weight  than  comparative  harm.  Additionally,  comparative  benefits  can  justify  non-
comparative harms.
One possible strategy is to suggest that a version of Woollard's claim is correct. Namely that
non-comparative harms to future people can be outweighed by harm-based concerns of current
people.  The disjunctivist  can explain  the weighing of  harms and benefits  similar  to  Shiffrin
(1999)  and Harman  (2004).  By that  I  mean  two  things:  (i)  inflicting  harm can  be  morally
justified, but it is first and foremost the prevention of harm that can do that justificatory work and
(ii) harms have a special moral importance. The latter claim means that we have  a stronger
moral reason to care about harms than benefits – possibly even in a case where the benefits
outweigh the harms.  Note  that  this  is  linked to  the first  claim since if  harms  are especially
morally important, then, it is plausible that what can justify harms is the prevention of greater
harms and not greater benefits.
One might  wonder  how the  second  claim is  relevant  to  the  issue  at  hand,  since  we are
interested  in  finding out  how to  weigh benefits  against  harms.  However,  some comparative
benefits can be considered equivalent to avoiding or preventing comparative harms. Consider
Shiffrin on this point: “Although we sometimes speak as though removing someone from harm
benefits that person, it does not follow that the beneficial aspect of the saving does the moral
justificatory work for inflicting the lesser harm. Rather, I believe the fact that a greater harm is
averted performs the justificatory service”  (Shiffrin, 1999, p. 126). It follows from this line of
reasoning that saving Sarah prevents a comparative harm, even if it can also be called providing
a comparative benefit (as Woollard does). I suggest, in line with Shiffrin, that what does the
justificatory work in Saving Sarah is the prevention of harm. Before explaining how that is done
in more detail, we turn to the second claim – that the disjunctivist can embrace Harman's idea
that harm has a special moral importance. 
According  to  Harman,  “[...]  reasons  against  harm  are  so  morally  serious  that  the  mere
presence  of  greater  benefits  to  those  harmed  is  not  in  itself  sufficient  to  render  the  harms
permissible:  when there is  an alternative in  which parallel  benefits  can be provided without
parallel harms, the harming action is wrong” (Harman, 2004, p. 93).30 In support of this view,
30 Harman rejects that benefits provided to a person can outweigh the harms to that same person. The issue at hand is
broader and concern if benefits can outweigh harms, generally, even if they do not share the same subject. However,
it is even less likely that benefits provided to one person can outweigh harms done to another person. That is since
benefits  are  more  plausibly seen  as  compensation  for  the  harm if  they  concern  the  same  person.  It  is  more
questionable that a benefit provided to me can compensate for a harm done to you.
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Harman formulates an example where a woman is raped, becomes pregnant and raises the child
whom she truly loves. The woman does not wish that things were different, since she is able to
cope with the trauma remarkably well and her child would not have been born then  (Harman,
2004, p. 99). We can imagine that the benefits outweighed the harms because she was made
better off overall. However, does that mean that the person who raped her had a stronger reason
to perform the act than to avoid it? In line with Harman, I think not:
The benefits in these cases do outweigh the harms in that they are more beneficial than the harms
are harmful: the total package of benefits plus harms leaves the person better off than he or she
would otherwise be. But the benefits do not outweigh the harms in that they do not render it
permissible to cause the harms. Another way of putting this is that the reasons to benefit do not
outweigh the reasons against harm, though the benefits themselves outweigh the harms (Harman,
2004, p. 100)
Harman distinguishes between two questions:  can benefits outweigh harms? And  can benefit-
based reasons  outweigh harm-based reasons? The answer  to  the  first  question  is  yes.  If  an
outcome involves both pro tanto harms and pro tanto benefits, but the person is made better off
overall, then, the benefits outweigh the harms. It is not as easy to answer the second question and
this is not the place to offer a full response. However, to say that we in general have a moral
reason to perform an act that involves great harm because it involves even greater benefit is
implausible in the light of cases such as those presented by Harman.
Let us move on to how this understanding of harm and benefit can explain the intuition about
Saving Sarah. More specifically,  that the benefit  provided to Sarah can justify that Victor is
harmed. As mentioned, in relation to Shiffrin, saving Sarah can also be seen as the prevention of
harm. The intuition that harming Victor can be justified by saving Sarah can thus be explained by
the fact that it prevents great harm. Additionally, if we take the hypothetical example seriously
we know that there is no way of preventing Victor's death. Victor is harmed in both possible
scenarios, but in one scenario the harm to Sarah is avoided. I suggest that the prevented harm and
the fact that Victor cannot be spared explain the intuition about Saving Sarah. It is not necessary
to claim that comparative benefits in general can outweigh non-comparative harms, as Woollard
implies.
What about Pollution and the disjunctivist response to the Non-Identity Problem? If we adopt
the idea that what justifies harms is the prevention of greater harm, then, the disjunctive analysis
of non-identity cases seems more plausible. It is reasonable that pollution can be justified if it
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prevents greater harm. Imagine, for example,  that keeping a factory operational and continue
polluting  actually  prevents  currently  living  people  from  being  severely  harmed.  Perhaps  it
prevents people from a life in poverty and thereby the pollution is instrumental for keeping them
in a sur-threshold state.
So far so good, but for this to work as a response to the Non-Identity Problem one would have
to support the claim that: pollution is justified if and only if the harm-based concern of existing
people are as severe, or more severe than that of future people. Notably, the above reasoning is
build  on the assumption  that  the prevention  of  greater  (or  equally great)  harm provides  the
justificatory service. But the claim is questionable in the light of an over-determination version of
Pollution:31
Pollution*  – The people inhabiting the earth at t1 pollutes the earth in such a way that
resources will be scarce for people living 400 years later, at t2. Since the water and air lack
sufficient quality at t2, the future people suffer from serious health problems.  However, if
the pollution at t1 was stopped, then, a natural disaster would take place and result in the
exact same suffering for the people at t2. 
First, it is assumed that the actions at t1 prevent some comparative harm (to the inhabitants at t1)
in both  Pollution and  Pollution*. The intuitions about the moral status of pollution are altered
when the suffering of future people is overdetermined. Now it seems permissible (maybe even
required) for people at t1 to continue polluting. This shows that pollution can be justified, even if
the harm to current people is not as severe (or more severe) than that to future people. 
In summary, it is possible that the concern of current people can outweigh our reason to stop
pollution on my suggested understanding of the disjunctive view. Moreover, it is primarily harm-
based concerns that will do the justificatory work. I assume that this result is more acceptable
than that any great comparative benefit (like increased wealth to well off people) can justify non-
comparative harm. However,  his  strategy does not take the disjunctivist  all  the way. How to
handle the implications of Pollution* is still unclear.
31 I am grateful to Fiona Woollard for pointing out that the strategy has this weakness. 
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4.3 Unity
It is the dual nature of harm that ensures the disjunctive view its advantages, but the duality also
raises doubts about its theoretical merit. A possible objection against the disjunctive view is that
it lacks unity. There are three aspects of this objection: it questions (i) that the view sustains a
common core of harm, (ii) that it  offers a unified treatment of harm and benefit,  and (iii) it
accuses the view of being ad-hoc. These three objections (or versions of the objection) will be
presented, in that order, before turning to possible solutions. 
Combining  two  conditions  in  a  disjunctive  manner  does  not  sit  well  with  the  Unity
desideratum mentioned in the background, especially not considering Bradley's formulation in its
fullness: 
The analysis should not merely be a list of some things that can happen to someone, nor should it
have ad hoc features designed solely to account for particular cases. It should explain what all
harms have in common by locating a common core to harm. Perhaps more controversially, it
should also allow for a unified treatment of harm and benefit (Bradley, 2012, p. 395). 
It is required that an account explains what all harms share. This feature comes for free to any
account that relies on one sufficient and necessary condition. According to a comparative view,
all harms have in common that they are such that a subject is made worse off. Similarly, on a
non-comparative view all harms share the feature of being a bad state. On the disjunctive view
there is no single feature, either comparative or non-comparative, that all harms share. 
The last part of Bradley's Unity desideratum states that an account should allow for a unified
treatment of harms and benefits.  This is  controversial  as Bradley points out.  How are we to
understand this requirement? If it entails that harm and benefit must operate on the same scale
and be each other's mirror images, it seems too strong. It would presuppose a strictly comparative
understanding of harm and benefit. However, it can reasonably be required that the treatment of
harm and benefit is spelled out plausibly and without contradictions. 
Hanser considers a version of the disjunctive view as a reply to the Non-Identity Problem, but
he  dismisses  it  quite  quickly  for  being  ad-hoc.  He  considers  the  following  version  of  the
disjunctive account: “A harms B with respect to the relevant dimension of functioning if either (i)
B’s state of functioning along that dimension would have been better had A acted differently, or
(ii) B would not have existed at  all  had A acted differently”  (Hanser, 2009, p. 191). Hanser
considers the second condition to be non-comparative. Using current terminology, this condition
is neither comparative nor non-comparative since it does not explain harm in terms of being in a
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comparatively or  non-comparatively bad state.  What  is  important  here,  however,  is  that  this
version of the disjunctive view holds that the two conditions apply to different sorts of cases. In
the  light  of  the  Non-Identity Problem one  might  be  inclined  to  claim that  the  comparative
condition is applicable in all cases except identity-affecting ones, and that in those cases the non-
comparative condition is applicable. Furthermore, the account that Hanser considers understands
benefits comparatively (a person is benefited iff she is made better off) and a person is neither
benefited  nor  harmed  if  she  is  made  neither  worse  off  nor  better  off.  In  other  words,  the
conditions for  benefiting, for  neither benefiting nor harming and for  harming in identity cases
are all comparative. Only the condition for  harming in non-identity cases is non-comparative.
Therefore, Hanser concludes that this account is ad hoc and should be rejected.
In  responding  to  the  unity  objection,  there  seems  to  be  two  main  strategies  for  the
disjunctivist. First, one can admit that the view is ad hoc, but argue that the flaws of other views
are more serious. One can claim that non-identity cases alone motivates that we acknowledge
non-comparative  harm.  The  restricted  condition  can  be  supported  by claiming  that  identity-
affecting cases are peculiar or different. Therefore, special treatment is justified. Moreover, the
desiderata are desirable features and not absolute conditions for accepting or rejecting a theory.
Therefore, it is possible to claim that this view is superior to strict views even if it is ad hoc,
since it satisfy the Extensional Adequacy desideratum to a higher degree. It captures the harm of
ordinary losses  in  identity  cases  and  that  of  future  people's  suffering  in  non-identity cases.
However,  this  reasoning seems to require further justification of why identity-affecting cases
need special treatment. The identity-affecting events are not all different, since they are harms.
The identity-affecting feature must  have some special  significance that  is  relevant  for  harm.
Otherwise we cannot accept that identifying harms requires a special condition solely in identity-
affecting cases. There is no apparent justification for treating such cases differently, but still keep
them within the realm of harms. This does not mean that there is none. However, without a good
story about why they are different – but not so different that they are not harms – this strategy
seems to stand on shaky ground.
Second, it can be argued that not all versions of the disjunctive view are clearly designed to
account for particular cases. A disjunctive view need not restrict the non-comparative condition
to non-identity cases. One can hold that both conditions are unrestricted and applicable in all
sorts of cases. Such a formulation of the disjunctive view simply holds that the conditions are
applicable in all cases where they are satisfied. This view is not ad hoc in the sense discusses in
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relation to  Hanser.  There is  no special  treatment of any type of cases,  acts  or scenarios.  No
condition is designed just to avoid a specific problem (like the Non-Identity Problem). 
I imagine that some people want to object to this strategy by claiming that non-comparative
harm is only found in non-identity cases. That seems incorrect. Even if it should be granted that,
in general, comparative harm is found in many ordinary cases involving existing people and the
non-comparative sense of harm is often relevant when someone is caused to exist under poor
conditions.  However,  that  is  due  to  the  identity-affecting  feature  of  many  events  and  not
necessarily an essential  structural  feature of  what  it  is  to  suffer  harm. Phrased differently,  it
happens to be so that harmful identity-affecting cases and cases of non-comparative harms often
coincide since our  existence is  contingent  upon previous  events.  If my imagined objector is
unmoved  by  this  reasoning,  there  are  a  couple  more  reasons  for  thinking  that  the  non-
comparative sense of harms is more broadly identifiable.
There are at least two other reasons for thinking that we find non-comparative harms outside
of  non-identity  cases.  As  already  discussed,  Woollard  identifies  non-comparative  harms  in
preemption cases and it can be found in combination with comparative harm – as in canceling
the  J-program. There are  other  examples  as  well.  Imagine that  person  X has  200 units  of  a
particular good. A decrease from that to 150 is a comparative harm. Another person Y goes from
having  100  to  50  units  and  her  state  is  thereby  sub-threshold.  Therefore,  the  latter  is  a
comparative harm as well  as a non-comparative harm. The harm done to  Y intuitively seem
worse, since her state is worse by absolute measures. The disjunctive view has the capacity to
account for the intuition by referring to the fact that the latter is a dual harm and in that sense
greater.  If this reasoning is plausible, then both senses of harm are identifiable more broadly.
Non-comparative harms are present in preemption cases and in combination with comparative
harms (as well as in non-identity cases) while comparative harm is found in all sorts of losses.
This lends independent support for the strategy.
Additionally, and regardless of the two strategies above, it can be suggested that the most
plausible  and straight-forward treatment  of benefit  is  structurally equivalent  to  that  of  harm.
Hence, the nature of benefit is disjunctive and combines a comparative and non-comparative
condition:
The Disjunctive View of Benefit: P is benefited iff (i) P is made better off  or (ii) P is
caused (allowed) to be in a good state.
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Plausibly, there are different versions of the disjunctive view of benefit depending on the same
aspects as discussed in relation to the disjunctive view of harm in section 3.3. In any case, a
disjunctive treatment of both harm and benefit is unified in the sense that both harm and benefit
are, structurally, dual in nature. Comparative harms and comparative benefits are each other's
mirror  images.  Non-comparative  harms  cause  a  person  to  be  in  a  bad  state  while  non-
comparative benefits cause a person to be in a good state. An example of an account that lack this
sort  of  unity  is  Rivera-López  (2009) who  acknowledges  the  moral  significance  of  non-
comparative harms, but not non-comparative benefits. Harms and benefits are distinct in that
sense. Plausibly, such a treatment of benefit and harm can be questioned since it fails to satisfy
the Unity desideratum. The disjunctive view is not a clear target of such criticism since it treats
harms and benefits the same – they are structurally both comparative and non-comparative.
In one way it  is  clear that  the disjunctive account  lacks unity,  because it  is  built  on two
essentially different senses of harm. It is an obvious theoretical dismerit if the lack of unity is due
to the fact that the account is ad-hoc. However, if the above reasoning is plausible, there is reason
to think that both conditions are unrestricted and both senses of harms are broadly identifiable.
So the accusation – that the view is designed to take care of a particular type of case or problem –
misses its target. Also, a view that adopts a disjunctive view of benefits manages to treat harms
and benefits in a unified manner.
5 Concluding Remarks
The disjunctive view of  harm is  promising,  but  serious  issues  remain to  be dealt  with.  The
hopeful idea that a disjunctive view can avoid all traditional problems for strict views seems
overly optimistic. More specifically, the combination does not allow the disjunctivist to escape
the Omission Problem or account for deadly preemption cases. There are also some problematic
implications of the disjunctivist's response to the Non-Identity Problem. On the other hand, it can
be argued that disjunctive views have the capacity to account for many of the troublesome cases
and that they are capable of capturing the extension of harm to a higher degree than strict views.
If my attempt to defend the disjunctive view is plausible, then, it can be formulated in a unified
way that begins to explain how the seriousness of different harms is measured as well as how
harm-based  reasons  stand  in  relation  to  benefit-based  reasons.  Moreover,  the  disjunctive
understanding that  I advocate  is  incompatible  with  the  No-Difference View since  both  non-
comparative  harms  and  non-comparative  benefits  have  independent  reason-giving  weight.
34
5. Concluding Remarks
However, that does not force one to accept the Difference View. Rather, this understanding of the
disjunctive view implies the more intuitive Some-Difference View. That being said, I do not wish
to imply that all the work of developing and evaluating the disjunctive view is done, but we
should take the disjunctive view as a serious alternative to strict views and discuss it further.
The debate about the disjunctive theory is starting to take shape, but many questions are not
yet  addressed.  For  example,  the  disjunctivists  who are  abortion  defenders  might  struggle  to
explain how the comparative harm to the child-to-be can be outweighed, and do so in a way that
does not  result  in  implausible  implications  (McMahan,  2013, p.  33).  Also,  acknowledging a
reason in favor of causing people to exist (due to the non-comparative benefit) might give fuel to
Parfit's  Repugnant  Conclusion  (McMahan,  2013,  p.  34).  Again,  these  are  just  some  of  the
challenges that lay ahead for the disjunctive view. How well the disjunctive view is equipped for
dealing with these questions is yet to be seen.
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